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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-2689
___________
HILTON KARRIEM MINCY,
Appellant
v.
EDWARD KLEM, ET AL.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-00790)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Connor
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 19, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Hilton Karriem Mincy is confined at the State Correctional Institution at
Albion in Pennsylvania. Mincy appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 40(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint as a sanction under Rule 40(b) for

abuse of discretion. See In re: Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996);
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
The relevant facts are as follows. Mincy filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against nearly seventy-seven prison officials and staff,
alleging a litany of claims, including retaliation, conspiracy, denial of due process,
fabricated misconduct reports, interference with mail, and verbal and physical abuse.
That initial complaint was over 215 pages and contained nearly 687 paragraphs of
allegations. The District Court ordered Mincy to file an amended complaint, using a civil
rights form-complaint and setting forth simple, concise and direct averments in adherence
to Rule 8(e); it moreover ordered that the amended complaint should, pursuant to Rule
20(a), name only those defendants implicated in the transaction or occurrence giving rise
to his claims and whose involvement in the suit presents a common question of law or
facts. The court warned that it would dismiss Mincy’s complaint as a sanction if he failed
to comply with those instructions.
In response to the court’s order, Mincy filed an amended complaint using
the court-furnished form. Mincy’s amended form-complaint plainly asserted various
allegations of retaliation against prison officials for exercising his First Amendment
rights. At the conclusion of the amended form-complaint, however, Mincy alerted the
District Court that he planned to file a “proposed amended complaint” pursuant to Rule
15(a). Subsequently, he filed that proposed amended complaint, which was 166 pages,
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contained more than 500 paragraphs of allegations, and named more than seventy-seven
defendants.
Finding both submissions to be non-compliant with its order, the District
Court dismissed his action under Rule 40(b). Specifically, it found that the formcomplaint and the proposed amended complaint contained the same deficiencies as the
original, referencing numerous unrelated claims and parties. Noting that it had afforded
Mincy multiple opportunities to remedy those deficiencies in his pleadings, and that he
failed to properly do so, the District Court concluded that Mincy’s conduct had made
adjudication of the case impossible. Accordingly, the District Court conducted no Poulis
analysis before dismissing the case as a sanction.
I.
Rule 8(a)(1) requires that a complaint set forth a short and plain statement
of the plaintiff’s claims. We conclude that the District Court correctly ordered Mincy to
file an amended complaint using a form-complaint, because his original one was unduly
long. However, in light of the liberal construction given to pro se pleadings, we cannot
conclude that Mincy’s amended form-complaint does not satisfy Rule 8. His averments
under the “Statement of Claim” section of the form-complaint plainly allege that the
Defendants have retaliated against him for filing lawsuits, grievances and complaints
against prison officials, as a means of deterring him from exercising his First Amendment
rights.
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Additionally, we agree that under Rule 20 a plaintiff may join defendants in
one action only if they assert a right to relief arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence. The District Court correctly concluded that Mincy’s attempts to incorporate
separate and unrelated claims against parties from other lawsuits are inappropriate.
However, we note that Rule 21 instructs that the misjoinder of parties provides no
grounds for dismissing an action. See Rule 21; Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245,
1249 (3d Cir. 1972). Courts may add or drop parties under Rule 21, but they may not
dismiss actions where there has been a misjoinder of parties. Letherer v. Alger Group,
LLC., 328 F.3d. 262 267 (6 th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the District Court erred in
dismissing Mincy’s complaint on this basis.
II.
As we have explained, dismissals under Rule 40(b) are “only appropriate in
limited circumstances . . . ”, Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184,190 (3d Circ.
2002), because they are “drastic” and “extreme measures” that should only be reserved
for cases where there has been “‘flagrant bad faith’ on the part of the plaintiffs.” Poulis,
747 F.2d at 867-68 (quoting Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 643 (1976)).
On review, this Court should be “guided by the manner in which the
[District Court] balanced the Poulis factors, and whether the record supports its findings.”
Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986). Those factors are: (1) the extent of the
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party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to
meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
the conduct of the party or the attorney was wilful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6)
the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Failure to consider
these factors is considered an abuse of discretion. See Livera v. First Nat. State Bank of
New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1188 (3d Cir. 1989).
The District Court decided that Mincy’s conduct – filing a seemingly noncompliant form complaint and an additional proposed amended complaint – made
adjudication of the case “impossible,” and that it was accordingly unnecessary to weigh
the Poulis factors before dismissing the case under Rule 41(b). In support of that
proposition, the District Court cited Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir.
1990) and Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994).

The “impossibility”

exception relieves a district court from analyzing the Poulis factors. However, our
opinions in Guyer and Spain do not support dismissal here: The District Court has not
shown that Mincy’s conduct suggests that he clearly intended to abandon the case, see id.
at 455, or that his behavior had been so egregious as to suggest that he no longer wished
to pursue his claims, see Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1430.
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for
further proceedings.
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